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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner.

v.

CHRISTOPHER BLAIN OSTLER.

Defendant/Respondent.

No 20000287-SC

:

Priority 13

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
UPON'GRANTOFCERTIORARIREVIEW

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The State appeals the court of appeals' decision in State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App
28. 996 P.2d 1065, whichvacated defendant's misdemeanor convictions based on his

guilty pleas. See Addendum A {Ostler opinion). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

its grant of certiorari review. UTAH CODE ANN-. § 78-2-2(3)(a) & (5) (1996). See
Addendum B {Order, Case No. 20000287-SC, dated July 12, 2000 ).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON CERTIORARI REVIEW,

STANDARDS OF REVIEW. AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW

Did the Utah Court ofAppeals have jurisdiction to decide the merits of

defendant's motion to withdraw his guiltypleas, once it concluded that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits?

Standards ofReview. When exercising certiorari jurisdiction, this Court reviews

the decision of the court of appeals for correctness, according no deference to its
conclusions of law. See Esquivel v. Labor Com 7r. 2000 UT 66, •(l 1, 396 Utah Adv.
Rep. 3.

In reviewing the issues, the Court applies the same standard of review applicable
to the court of appeals. See State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79,^3, 985 P.2d 911 "Whether

appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law which [this Court upon a grant of

certiorari] review[s] for correctness, giving no deference to the decision below." Pledger
v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, If16, 982 P.2d 572.

Preservation: The trial court summarily denied defendant's motion to withdraw as

untimely (R. 72). On appeal:, the State argued that the untimeliness of defendant's motion

deprived the appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the motion's merits. See Briefof
Appellee, Case No. 980308-CA. Following the court of appeals' rejection of the State's
argument, Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, ^[8, this Court granted the State's request for
certiorari review of the appellate jurisdictional issue. See Addendum B.
STATUES, RULES. AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The following provisions, attached to Addendum C, are determinative:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(1999)
UtahR.Crim.P. 11(0-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant Respondent was charged with unlawful control of a motor vehicle

(joyriding), a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314(l)
(1993). and assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § "6-5-102

(1999) (R. 2-4). On February 19. 1998. defendant pled guilty to both misdemeanor
charges (R. 17 & Docket Entry, dated February 19. 1998). The trial court informed

defendant that he had thirty days to move to withdraw his pleas (R. 69: 2-6). Ostler. 2000
UT App 28. 5c2-3. Two months later, on May 18, 1998, defendant was sentenced to

concurrent jail terms and ordered to pay restitution (R. 17). Id. at 14.

On June 8, 1998, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, claiming, among
other issues, that the misdemeanor pleas should be vacated because he was not

represented by counsel (R. 21-22). The trial court denied defendant's motion as untimely
in that the motion was not filed within thirty days of the entry of the guilty pleas as

required by Utah CODE Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1999) (R. 72-73; see also Supplemental
Record: Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Pleas, Third Dist. No. 985101649. dated
March 19, 1999). Ostler, 2000 UT App 28,15.

Defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his motion (R. 21-22, 26-27).
The Utah Court of Appeals vacated defendant's convictions. Ostler. 2000 UT App
28,127. While the court of appeals agreed that defendant's motion to withdraw was
untimely and jurisdictional^ barred in the trial court, id. at 18, the court of appeals

concluded that defendant's lack of counsel in the misdemeanor case created "exceptional

circumstances" justifying the appellate court's consideration of the merits. Id. at HI 1 &

24. The court of appeals ultimately held that the trial court "plainly erred" in taking the
pleas without strictly complying with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at
1112-23 & 27.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts surrounding defendant's crimes are irrelevant to a determination of the
issue on review.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Consistently, this Court - as well as the United States Supreme Court and
numerous state jurisdictions - has recognized that an appellate court's subject-matter

jurisdiction is strictly circumscribed: its legal authority to hear and determine the ments
of a claim on direct appeal extends no further than that of the trial court.

In Ostler, the court of appeals chose to disregard this long-standing and wellrecognized rule. While recognizing that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
over defendant's untimely motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, the court of appeals
improperly used the doctrines of plain error and exceptional circumstances, judicially-

created exceptions to the preservation rule, to create subject-matter jurisdiction where
none legally existed. In so doing, it violated the axiom that a court may not unilaterally
expand its own jurisdiction beyond that authorized by law.

If a court determines the merits of a claim when it has no authority to do so. the
court, by definition, acts ultra vires. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider
the ments of defendant's untimely motion to withdraw, the court of appeals' only course
was to summanly affirm the trial court's denial and otherwise dismiss the appeal. In turn,
defendant's recourse is to seek post-conviction relief.
ARGUMENT

THE JUDICIALL Y-CREA TED EXCEPTIONS OF PLAIN ERROR
AND EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES MAY NOT BE USED TO
EXPAND ANAPPELLA TE COURTS JURISDICTION BEYOND
THATAUTHORIZED BYLAW

In State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, 996 P.2d 1065 {Addendum A), the Utah Court

of Appeals correctly concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the
ments of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, but then erroneously used plain
enor and exceptional circumstances, exceptions to the preservation rule, to review the
ments of defendant's claim on appeal.

Judicially-created exceptions to the preservation requirement, however, cannot
create subject-matter jurisdiction where none legally exists. Instead, the ''well-established

rule" is that "in cases appealed from an inferior court to a superior court having appellate
junsdiction only the appellate court acquires only such jurisdiction as the inferior court
had." Burt& Carlquist Co. v. Marks, 177 P. 224, 226 (Utah 1918). For this reason,

once the court of appeals determined that the trial court lacked junsdiction to consider the
ments of Ostler's claim, the intermediate appellate court was likewise bound by the same

junsdictional limitations. See Yearian v. Speirs, 10 P. 609, 617 (Utah 1886) ("the
appellate court can have no more authority to try the merits of the case on appeal than the
justice from whosejudgment the appeal was taken"), overruledon other gds.. People v.
Douglass, 14 P. 801 (Utah 1887). The court of appeals' consideration of the ments in
this case was, therefore, an ultra vires act. See Steel Company v. Citizensfor a Better
Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1998) ("For a court to pronounce upon tie meaning

or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by
very definition, for a court to act ultra vires.").
A. The Trial Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction.

A defendant, who is properly notified, has thirty days from the entry of his guilty

plea to move to withdraw the plea. See UTAH CODE Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1999); Utah
R. Crtm. P. 11 (e)(7). Thereafter, the defendant's right to withdraw the plea is legally

"extinguished." State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993) {per curium). And, a
trial court may not consider the merits of an untimely-filed motion to withdraw but must

simply deny it. See State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 583 (Utah App. 1992) (section 76-136's time limitation is jurisdictional); State v. Canfietd, 917 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah App.
1996) (same).

In this case, the court: of appeals correctly found that defendant was notified of the
thirty-day limitation and

failed to file his motion [to withdraw his guilty pleas] until well after me
time limit [under section 77-13-6(2)(b)] had expired. Because defendant's

motion was untimely, the tnal court was without junsdiction to reach the
ments.

Ostler. atr8 (citing Price. 837 P.2d at 583). While Ostler conditionally cross-petitioned
to review this conclusion, the cross-petition was not granted. See Addendum B. The

question on review, therefore, is limited to whether, on direct appeal, an appellate court
has greater authority to consider the ments of an extinguished claim than the tnal court.'
This Court, as well as the United States Supreme Court and numerous state courts, has

consistently responded "no."1
B. Because the Trial Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, the
Appellate Court Likewise Had No Jurisdiction to Consider the Merits.

Despite the trial court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the court of appeals
concluded that in "accordance with State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998),

however, this court can review defendant's guilty pleas for plain error or exceptional
circumstances." Ostler, id. The court of appeals' conclusion is wrong.
"Jurisdiction is the power to hear, try, and determine" the merits of a claim,
Yearian, 10 P. at 619, and is wholly derived from constitution and statute. See Salt Lake

City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 849 (Utah 1994); State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah

1 This case only involves an appellate court's legal authonty to review the merits
of a jurisdictionally-barred claim on direct appeal. In contrast, as will be discussed in
Subsection D, infra at 16-17, a defendant has a statutory right to nght to collaterally
attack a constitutionally-flawed plea. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq. (1996).
This Court also recognizes an inherent "writ" power to correct "fundamentally-flawed"
convictions. See Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 253 (Utah 1998); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1211 n.7 (Utah 1993).

1983). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-9(6) (1999) (defining jurisdiction as a court's

"area of authority"). As such, a court's junsdiction is ""inflexible and without
exception,'" and may not be expanded beyond that conferred by law. Steel Company.
523 U.S. at 95 (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).

Accord Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1984) (a court's
junsdiction may not be conferred by stipulation). Indeed, the "lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is so fundamental that it requires dismissal whenever it is raised and
demonstrated." Dishmon v.. Shelby State Community College, 15 S.W.3d477, 480

(Tenn. App. 1999), cert, denied (Tenn. 2000).
Moreover, "[t]he statutory and (especially) constitutional elements ofjurisdiction
are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts

from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding
certain subjects." Steel Company, 523 U.S. at 101 (parenthetical in original). Accord

Ohms, 881 P.2d at 852. See also Anastasoffv. United States, 2000 WL 1182813, *3 (8th
Cir. August 22, 2000) (discussing in context ofjudicial precedent, the importance of
jurisdictional limits in maintaining the appropriate separation of powers). Thus, a court
may not modify its own jurisdiction, "even to effect a desirable objective." Taylor, 664
P.2d at 445. Accord Dillon Stores v. Board of County Com Vs., 912 P.2d 170, 175 (Kan.

1996) (an appellate court has "no authority to assume jurisdiction on the theory that it is
the practical thing to do"). See also State v. Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264, 265 (Utah 1997)

(even though constitutional right to appeal was involved, the appellate court lacked

junsdiction to consider the merits of an appeal where the notice of appeal was
prematurely filed); State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064. 1067 n.2 (Utah 1993) (a defendant

may not directly appeal following his failure to move to withdraw his plea, but may
pursue post-conviction relief); Earle v. Warden, 811 P.2d 180, 181 (Utah 1991) (the

supreme court lacked jurisdiction to consider an untimely pro se petition for cenioran,
even though the defendant had "at least an arguable case for reversible enor by the tnal
court in refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea"); State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d
36. 37-38 (Utah 1981) (an untimely-filed appeal must be dismissed for lack of junsdiction
regardless ofthe merits); State v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1118, 1120-21 (Utah App. 1997) (the

court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider an untimely-filed appeal, or to expand the
time for filing a notice of appeal by a prison inmate, even though the appellate court
viewed the defendant's proposed exception for inmate mailings as appropnate and
preferable).

"[Authorities practically all agree" on the "well-established rule" that an appellate
court on direct appeal only acquires "such [subject-matter] jurisdiction as the infenor
court had." Burt & Carlquist, 111 P. at 226. See also Yearian, 10 P. at 617 (an appellate
court can have no greater authority to reach the merits than the trial court). Accord Steel

Company. 523 U.S. at 1013 (an appellate court has no broader subject-matter junsdiction
than the lower court); United States v. Dickerson, 101 F.Supp. 262, 272 (E.D. Mo. 1951)

("A tribunal hearing a case on appeal can acquire no greater junsdiction over the subject

matter than the infenor court."), appeal dis 'd, 205 F.2d 151 (8th Cir. 1953); Koonce v.
Mitchell, 19 S,W.3d 603, 605 (Ark. 2000) ("When the trial court lacks subject-matter
junsdiction, the appellate court also lacks subject-matter jurisdiction."); Cadie Co. v.
Ginsberg, 721 A.2d 1246, 1254 n.5 (Conn. App. 1998) (an appellate court has no
junsdiction to review the merits of a claim if the trial court lacked jurisdiction ofthe

ments), cert, denied, 724 A.2d 1125 (Conn. 1999); Gantz v. McHenry County Sheriffs
Dept. Merit Com 'n., 694 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (111. App.) (citing Greer v. III. Liquor
Control Com '«., 541 N.E.2d 216 (1989), for the rule that if the rnal court lacks

jurisdiction to consider the merits, the appellate court also lacks jurisdiction),, cert, denied,
699N.E.2d 1031 (111. \99%)Sandlin v. Roche Laboratories, Inc., 991 P.2d 883, 887

(Kan. 1999) ("if the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the appellate court likewise does not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the appeal"); State ex rel. Riverside
Pipeline Co. v. Public Service Com '/i., 2000 WL 1014898, *4 (Mo. App. July 25, 2000)
(when the lower court "lacks jurisdiction to render a judgment on the merits, the court of
appeals lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal from such a judgment on the merits");
King v. State, 2000 WL 10006227, *9, 614 N.W.2d 341 (Neb. 2000) ("When a lower

court does not have jurisdiction over the case before it, an appellate court also lacks
junsdiction to review the merits ofthe claim, issue, or question presented to me lower
court," citing Sack v. State, 610 N.W.2d 385, 390 (Neb. 2000)); Stephens v. John

10

Koenig, Inc.. 458 S.E.2d 233, 324 (N.C. App. 1995) ('"'the jurisdiction ofthe Court ot"
Appeals is derivative; therefore, if the court from which the appeal is taken had no
junsdiction, the Court of Appeals cannot acquire |unsdiction by appeal.'" quoting
Wiggins v. Pyramid Life Insurance Co.. 165 S.E.2d 54, 56 (N.C. App. 1969));
Insurance Co. v. Martinez, 18 S.W.3d 844. 847 (Texas App. 2000) {"An appellate
court's jurisdiction extends no further than the jurisdiction ofthe trial court."); Platte

Development Co. v. Environmental Quality Council, 966 P.2d 972. 974 (Wyo. 1998)

(an appellate court "can have no greater junsdiction ofthe subject matter than the distnct
court").

As a result, if an appellate court lacks subject-matter junsdiction, the ""only

function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.1"
Steel Company, 523 U.S. at 94 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 1 Wall 506. 514. 19 L.Ed.
264 (1868)). See also Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50,1[8, 5 P.3d 649 (if appellate
court lacks junsdiction, it must dismiss the appeal); Yearian, 10 P. at 617 (once an

appellate court determines that the lower court lacked subject-matter junsdiction. the

appellate court must dismiss the appeal). Accord Horn v. Dept. of Public Safety, 962
P.2d 95. 99 (Utah App. 1998) (if an appellate court lacks jurisdiction, it "retains only the
authority to dismiss the action,'" quoting Varina-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux. ^67 P.2d

569, 570 (Utah App. 1989)). See also Bender v. Williamsport Area SchoolDisL. 475
U.S. 534. 541 & n.4 (1986) (recognizing the "basic pnnciple," based on federal supreme

court precedent from 1804 to 1981, that if a lower court lacks jurisdiction, the appellate
court has jurisdiction "not ofthe merits but merely for the purpose of correcting the error
ofthe lower court in entertaining the suit") (quotation marks and citations omitted); Univ.
of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (1 V' Cir. 1999) (when

an appellate court lacks jurisdiction, it is "powerless" to consider the merits of the appeal
and must dismiss); Cadle Co., 721 A.2d at 1255 n.5 (an appellate court "cannot review
the ments of a claim that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to examine); Amantiad

v. Odum, 911 P.2d 160. 167(Hawai'i 1999) (if the lower court lacks jurisdiction, the
appellate court may not consider the ments); Gantz , 694 N.E.2d at 1081 ("As the trial

court lacked junsdiction to hear the case, this court does not have junsdiction to review
its decision and must dismiss the appeal,"; Dishmon, 15 S.W.3d at 480 ("when an

appellate court determines that a trial court lacked subject matter junsdiction. it must
vacate the judgment and dismiss the case without reaching the ments ofthe appeal,"

citing .AW. Kelly & Co. v. Conner, 123 S.W. 622, 637 (Tenn. 1909)); CRB v. Dept. of
Family Services, 974 P.2d 931, 934 (Wyo. 1999) (if the trial court lacks jurisdiction, the
appellate court has no authority to consider the merits).

In sum, having concluded that the trial court lacked junsdiction, the Ostler court

had but one course: to summanly affirm the tnal court's denial of defendant's untimely
motion and to otherwise dismiss defendant's appeal. Instead, the court unilaterally
expanded its own jurisdiction to reach the ments. The court's action was ultra vires.
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C. An Appellate Court May Not Unilaterally Expand Its Jurisdiction.

In Ostler, 2000 UT App 28. 58, the court of appeals properly recognized the
jurisdictional limits imposed on the tnal court by section 77-13-6(2)(b), but then
erroneously failed to apply those same junsdictional limitations to itself. Instead. Ostler

impermissibly used the judicially-created exceptions of plain error and exceptional
circumstances to resunect a nght - defendant's nght to directly challenge his pleas which had been legally "extinguished." Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995; Price, 837 P.2d at 583.

In so doing. Ostler confused an appellate court's discretion to act, with its power and
authority to act.

Plain error and exceptional circumstances are judicially-created exceptions to the
long-standing preservation rule that a litigant may not raise a new issue - even a
constitutional issue - for the first time on appeal. See Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 258
(Utah 1998); Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). Under the plain error

exception, an appellate court, which otherwise has subject-matterjurisdiction ofthe
appeal, may address an unpreserved issue if the trial court committed obvious, prejudicial
enor. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). The similar but narrower

exception of exceptional circumstances is reserved only for those cases with "rare
procedural anomalies." Id. at 1209 n.3. Preservation rules and their exceptions guide an
appellate court in excising its discretion on when it should act; but, judicial guidelines

cannot provide a court with the power to act where no legal authonty otherwise exists.

13

Cf Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 90 (1997) (recognizing distinction between "procedural

default," that is aparty's "critical failure to comply with state procedural law," which may
preclude consideration of an issue, and "jurisdiction" which deprives acourt ofthe power
to hear and determine acase). See also Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edition 1990)
(defimng "procedural default" as an omission by aparty in "carrying on alawsuit
including the pleading, process, evidence and practice;" and defining "jurisdiction" as the
"power ofa court to inquire into facts, apply the law, make decisions, and declare
judgment").

No Utah court - until Ostler - has applied the doctrines of plain error and

exceptional circumstances to cure alack ofjurisdiction.2 To the contrary, prior Utah
decisions have only used these judicially-created exceptions to reach issues in cases in

which the appellate court already had jurisdiction to consider the merits. Compare, e.g.,
Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1067 (refusing to reach merits of Johnson's claim that there was no

factual basis for the guilty pleas where Johnson failed to move to withdraw his pleas);
Earle, 811 P.2d at 181 (dismissing direct appeal even though Earle was not represented

" Subsequently, other defendants have argued that Ostler permits review ofthe
ments whenever adefendant can establish plain error or exceptional circumstances on

appeal. In State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, «|11, 397 Utah Adv. Rep 13 cert
petition filed but withdrawn by stipulation (August 21, 2000), the court ofappeals
applied Ostler and considered the ments of Tarnawiecki's untimely filed motion to
withdraw. Application of Ostler is also at issue in State v. McGee No 980136-SC
(orally argued May 23, 2000); State v. Hodges, No. 990613-CA, and State v. Medsker
No. 990266-CA.
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by counsel when untimely petition for certiorari was filed and the ments of his claim were
"arguable"); with Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54. v\5, 982 P.2d 5"2 (reaching merits
of issue after concluding that appellate court did in fact have subject-matter junsdiction);
State v. West. 765 P.2d 891, 894 (Utah 1988) (treating appeal from untimely motion to
withdraw as a post-conviction wnt where motion to withdraw was intertwined with
contemporaneous post-conviction petition)/
The court of appeals relied on only two cases, Marvin, 964 P.2d at 318, and
Price, 837 P.2d at 580, for its singular application ofthe procedural bar/preservation

exceptions. Ostler, at ^[8. Neither case supports Ostler's consideration ofthe ments.

Marvin was an Anders-Clayton^ appeal in which this Court was duty-bound to
"independently examinef]" the issues raised by Marvin to determine if his claims of
ineffective counsel and prosecutorial misconduct were "wholly frivolous" and, thus,
subject to summary affirmance. Marvin, 964 P.2d at 314. While reference was made to
plain enor and exceptional circumstances in light of Marvin's failure to move to

withdraw his plea, the Court did not use the judicial exceptions to create or expand
jurisdiction where none existed. Instead, this Court utilized the exceptions to demonstrate

3 See Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1037 n.8 (recognizing that the "somewhat strangely
intertwined" nature of West's motion to withdraw and his postconviction petition resulted
in the issues being reviewed in West as "if they arose in a habeas proceeding").

4 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah
1981) (both cases establish the procedure for appointed counsel to follow when counsel
believes a cnminal appeal is without merit).
15

that, under any scenario, defendant's appeal contained no mentorious issues. Marvin,
964P.2dat3l7-18.

Similarly, in Price, the discussion ofthe merits constitutes dicta in that the

appellate court had already concluded that Pnce's motion was untimely and. therefore,
jurisdictionally barred from; consideration of its ments. Price, 837 P.2d at 582 & 584

(Bench, J., specially concumng) (noting that in light of holding that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction, it was "unnecessary (and improper) to opine about the merits") (parenthetical
in onginal).

Marvin and Price do not justify Ostler's unilateral expansion ofthe appellate
court's jurisdiction. Instead, Ostler stands alone, without legal support, and against
precedent and. authority.
/). Even When a Defendant Fails to Timely File a Motion to Withdraw

and Therefore Loses His Right to Directly Attack the Validity ofHis Plea,
An Alternative Remedy Exists.

Additionally, Ostler's erosion of jurisdictional principles was unnecessary. The
merits of Ostler's claims may equitably and legally be considered in a post-conviction
proceeding. See UTAH Code Ann. §77-13-6(3); Jiminez, 938 P.2d at 265; Earle, 811
P.2d at 181. See also Julian, 966 P.2d at 253 (declanng unconstitutional one-year statute

of limitations on filing of post-conviction petitions).

While an appellate court's jurisdiction on direct appeal maybe limited, its power
to entertain "extraordinary writs" is broad. Julian, 966 P.2d at 253; Hurst v. Cook, 111
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P.2d 1<)29. 11»34 (l.tah 1989). Indeed, the traditional function of post-con\iction review
is to "provide a means for collaterally attacking convictions when they are so
constitutionally flawed that they result in fundamental unfairness." Hurst. ~" P.2d at

1034. Accord Jiminez, 938 P.2d at 265 (directing the defendant to the potential post
conviction remedy after his direct appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction);
Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1067 (recognizing that proper remedy is for a defendant to seek

post-conviction relief when a direct appeal is unavailable due to the defendant's failure to
move to withdraw plea); Earle, 811 P.2d at 181 (concluding that a post-conviction
petition is the proper remedy when a petition for certioran is untimely); Johnson, 635

P.2d at 38 (post-conviction petition is proper remedy when a notice of appeal is

untimely). See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(3) (the thirty-day limitation for
withdrawing a plea does not restnet the "rights of an impnsoned person under [Utah
Code Ann. $ 78-35a-101 et seq. (1996)]").

For these reasons, defendant's remedy is to seek post-conviction relief.

E. The Impact of Ostler Is Far-Reaching And Substantial.

If plain enor and exceptional circumstances can overnde a clearly established

junsdictional limitation such as section 77-13-6(2)(b), the same exceptions may arguably
override any jurisdictional requirement. For example, rules 4 and 48, Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure, have uniformly been viewed as junsdictional bars to untimely-filed
appeals regardless ofthe merits. See Jiminez, 938 P.2d at 265; Johnson, 856 P.2d at
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1067; Earle, 81 1 P.2d at 190-81. After Ostler, a litigant may argue that failure to comply
appellate time requirements should likewise be excused based on the ments ofthe

litigant's claims. Such a result would not only render the time limitations meaningless,
but would effectively overrule long-standing precedent.
Furthermore, if appellate courts are not bound by jurisdictional limitations, trial
courts may likewise ignore junsdictional limits whenever- in the individual opinion of
the trial court - a litigant presents "exceptional circumstances" to excuse his or her

failures." Again, such an approach would not only encoarage continual litigation over
failures to meet clear-cut junsdictional deadlines, but would also lead to increased
disparate decisions on what constitutes "exceptional circumstances" to justify those
failures. Cf Anastasoff, 2000 WL 1182813, *3 (quoting 1 Blackstone, Commentaries

*258-59, for the proposition that unilateral expansions of power "in the hands of arbitrary
judges" result in decisions "regulated only by [the judges'] own opinions."
Even il\ Ostler is not extended beyond motions to withdraw guilty pleas, its impact
remains substantial. First and foremost, Ostler nullifies the jurisdictional limit set by
section 77-13-6(2)(b).

? Some jurisdictional rules, such as the time to file an appeal, may currently be
extended by the tnal court, but such extensions are strictly limited. See UTAH R. App. P.
4(e) (Addendum C). The judicially-created exceptions of plain error and exceptional
circumstances, on the other hand, have no time limitations.
18

Additionally, a guilty plea has traditionally been viewed as a quick and final
resolution to a case. Ostler sets that finality aside. Under Ostler - and in direct

contravention of section 77-13-6(2)(b) - the validity of a guilty plea may be directly
attacked years after the fact so long as a defendant establishes plain enor or exceptional
circumstances. This "[pjerpetual disrespect for the finality of convictions disparages the
entire criminal justice system. . . /There comes a point where a procedural system which
leaves matters perpetually open no longer reflects humane concern but merely anxiety and
a desire for immobility.'" McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 492 (1991) (quoting Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, ~6
Harx.L.Rev. 441, 452-53 (1963)). And, "[w]ithout finality, the cnminal law is deprived
of much of its deterrent effect." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989).
CONCLUSION

By permitting judicially-created exceptions to the preservation rule to overcome a
statutory junsdictional requirement, Ostler improperly invades the province ofthe

legislature, impermissibly creates rights where none existed, and illegally modifies the
court's own jurisdiction. Ostler sweeps broadly to create a remedy for defendant when
one already exists: defendant may pursue a collateral challenge to his guilty pleas through

a post-conviction petition. This Court should correct the fundamental error of Ostler by
vacating the court of appeals' consideration ofthe merits and affirming the trial court's
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dismissal of defendant's motion as untimely.

DATED this 7Vh clay of September, 2000.
JAN GRAHAM

Utah Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS

Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies ofthe foregoing Merits Brief of
Petitioner was mailed by first-class mail, postage pre-paid, to JOAN C. WATT, Salt Lake
Legal Defender Assoc, Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent, 424 East 500 South, Suite

300, this 7^LAay of September, 2000.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A
State v. Ostler. 2000 I'T. App. 28

'•yQ6 P 2d 1 ^

:^.M"tahAJ/. r^f 4?. zoooruhct App :s
(Cite as: 996 P.2d 1065)

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Il0kl030<l)

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee.

To succeed on a claim of plain error, a defendant has
the burden of showing (i) an error exists; i u) the error

v.

Christopher Blain OSTLER, Defendant and
Appellant.

should have been obvious to the tnal court; and (in)
the error is harmful.

[6] Criminal Law §=273.1(4)

No. 981308-CA.

110k273.1(4)
Feb. 10,2000.

[6] Criminal Law <§=1031<4)
Following entry of guilty pleas in the Third Distnct
Court. West Valley Department, Anthony B. Quinn,
J., to joyriding and assault, defendant appealed. The
Court of Appeals. Davis, J., held that multiple
violations of rule governing on-the-record colloquy
required for guilty pleas constituted plain error.
Vacated and remanded.

West Headnotes

[1| Criminal Law «S=»1134(10)

U0kl031(4)

Tnal court's failure in accepting guilty pleas to
determine whether defendant was represented bycounsel or had voluntanly waived nght to counsel, to
ask whether defendant was acting voluntanly, to
explain what constitutional nghts were being waived,
to explain nature and elements of charged crimes, to
inform defendant of possible punishments, and to
advise defendant of limited availability of appeal
constituted "plain error." U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6;
Rules CnmProc., Rule 1 He).

1lOkl134(10)

[71 Criminal Law <£=>273(4.1)
Ultimate question of whether the tnal court stnctiy
complied with constitutional and procedural
requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of
law

that

is

reviewed

for

correctness.

Rules

CnmProc.. Rule 11(e).

110k273(4.I)

Rule governing entry of guilty pleas squarely places
on tnal courts the burden of ensuring that
constitutional and procedural requirements are
complied with. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 11(e).

[2] Courts <S^90(2)
[8] Criminal Law §='273(4.1)

106k9CK2)

U0k273(4.1)

Doctrine of stare decisis precludes one panel of Court

of Appeals from overruling another panel's ruling.

Trial court must stnctiy adhere to rule governing
entry of guilty pleas. Rules Cnm.Proc., Rule 1He).

[3] Criminal Law <£=>274<9)
110k274(9)

[9] Criminal Law <3=>273.1(4)

Tnal court was without jurisdiction to reach merits of
untimely motion to withdraw guilty plea.

Accused.

110k273.1(4)

Under the stnct compliance test before accepting

U.C.A.1953, 77-13-6(2)fb).

guilty plea, trial court must review on the record with
[4] Criminal Law <S=M 044.2(1)
110kl044.2(l)

Court of Appeals could review defendant's guilty
pleas for plain error or exceptional circumstances,
despite defendant's failure to bring timely motion to
withdraw pleas. U.C.A.1953, 77-13-6<2)(b).
[5] Criminal Law <§=-1030(l)

the defendant at the time the plea is taken the nature
and elements of the offense, the constitutional nghts

which he waives by pleading guilty, and the allowable
penalties. Rules CnmProc., Rule 11(e).

[101 Criminal Law <£= 6413(3)
110k641.3(3)

Sixth Amendment nght to counsel attaches at the
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initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings,
whether by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.

(11| Criminal Law <®=264
H0k264

general terms the consequences of pleading guilty and
the constitutional rights that would be waived, but did
not address defendant's specific situation, did not
satisfy requirement of ensunng guilty pleas were
knowing and voluntary; videotape did not provide
notice of the nature of charges against defendant and
could not: take place of required on-the-record
colloquy. Rules CnraProc., Rule 11(e).

Sixth Amendment nght to counsel had attached at
arraignment when defendant entered guilty pleas.

[171 Criminal Law <$=» 1134(2)

U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.

HOkl 134(2)

[121 Criminal Law <S^273.1(4)

When dete:rrnimng whether a guilty plea was knowing
and voluntary, appellate court may consider more
than just the record of the plea heanng and may look
at the surrounding facts and circumstances. Rules

110k273.1(4)

Mere general questions at plea hearing which ask
whether a guilty plea is "voluntary" are insufficient;
specific inquiry should be made as to whether
defendant understands that by his plea he waives his
nghts against self- incrimination, to a jury tnal, to
appeal, and to confront witnesses. Rules Crim.Proc.,

Cnm.Proc , Rule 11(e).

(181 Criminal Law <®='1163(2)
110kll63I2)

110k273.1(l)

Where no valid waiver appears of rscord, the denial
of the right to the assistance of counsel at trial is
presumptively a substantial and prejudicial demal of a
constitutional right. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.

Rule 11(e).

[13] Criminal Law <®=*273.1(1)

If a defendant does not understand the nature and

1191 Criminal Law <®=^U66.10(1)

elements of the crime to which he pled guilty, his
guilty plea is involuntarily made. Rules CnraProc.,

110k:1166.10(l)

Rule 11(e).

A trial court's error that deprives a defendant of his or
her constitutional right to counsel will always

[141 Criminal Law <@=>1144.4

invalidate the conviction. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.

HOkl 144.4

[201 Criminal Law <®^273.1(1)
For purposes of detenriining validity of guilty plea, a
defendant's understanding of the elements of the
charges and the relationship of the law and the facts
may not be presumed from a silent or incomplete
examination. Rules CnntProc., Rule 11(e).

|151 Criminal Law <®=»273.1(4)
110k273.1(4)

110k273.1(l)

Guilty plea to joyriding charge that; was brought m
connection with defendant's operation of girlfriend's
car was involuntary, where defendant explained he
was not sure he was guilty of the offense but was
pleading guilty in order to "get on with [his] life."
U.C.A.1953, 4Ma-1314(l); Rules CrimProc., Rule
11(e).

M066 Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

In order for defendant's guilty plea to be valid, record
must show that he was unequivocably and clearly
informed about the sentence that would be imposed;
if trial court fails to do so, guilty plea is not
knowingly and voluntanly made and must be vacated.

County Attorney's Office, Salt Lake City, for

Rules CrimProc, Rule 11(e).

Appellee.

[16| Criminal Law <S=273.1(4)
U0k273.1(4)

David E. Yocom and J. Kevin Murphy, Salt Lake

Before GREENWOOD, P.J., DAVIS, and ORME,
JJ.

Having defendant view videotape that discussed in
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Copr. •£ West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

•J9b P 2j l-^f

(Cite as: 9% P.2d 1065, M066)
DAVIS. Judge:

given up if :he accused pieacs t'jiltv or n.o
contest,

and the different classifications oi

crimes and the corresponding pumsnments.

1 1 Defendant appeals his conviction for unlawful
control over a motor vehicle (joyriding), a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code .Ann. §

r 4 Defendant failed to appear at his presentence

41-la-1314(l)

interview with Adult Probation and Parole and for

(1998),

and

assault

a

class

B

misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
"6-5-102 (1999).
Defendant argues that the tnal
coun erred by accepting his guilty pleas without first
advising him of his nght to counsel and then securing
a knowing and voluntary waiver, and by failing to
conduct a Rule 11 plea colloquy on the record. We
agree.
Accordingly, we vacate defendant's
convictions and remand for further proceedings.

sentencmg.

A bench warrant was issued, defendant

was subsequently arrested, and the sentencmg heanng
v.as held on May 20, 1998. During this heanng,
defendant agam tned to explain that he was not guilty
of joyriding.
Unresponsive to defendant's
explananon, the judge sentenced defendant to
concurrent sentences of twelve months in jail for the
joynding conviction, and six months for the assault
conviction.

M067 BACKGROUND

1 5 On June 8, 1998, defendant filed a motion to

*| 2 An Informanon was filed charging defendant
with joyriding and assault. On February 19, 1998,
defendant was arraigned without counsel.
At the
an-aignment, the tnal judge asked defendant to enter a
plea on both charges. When asked, "How do you
plead to [joynding]?," defendant replied, "Guilty."
When asked by the tnal court, "How do you plead to
[assault]?," defendant replied, "Guilty I guess."
A
colloquy then ensued between the tnal judge and
defendant on the joyriding charge.
Defendant
explained that he was not sure he was guilty of
joynding because he had always used his girlfriend's
car, but that this time they had argued, which
prompted her to call the police and report her car as
stolen, even though she knew defendant had the car.
Defendant told the judge that the reason he was
pleading guilty was so he could "get it over with" and
"get on with [his] life."
The trial judge and
defendant did not discuss the assault charge.

1 3 Although after his guilty plea defendant
maintained his innocence on the joyriding charge, the
judge stated, "I'm going to go ahead and accept your
guilty pleas on the case.'' The tnal judge then asked
defendant, "Did you see the tape downstairs?," to
which defendant responded in the affirmative. [FN1]
The judge told defendant, "You only have 30 days to
make a motion to withdraw your pleas. After that,
it's too iate.
Do you understand that?" Defendant
replied,

"Yes."

Defendant was

then released to

pretnal services and a sentencmg date was set for
forty-five days later.
FN I. Although defendant does not so
concede, the tape referred to is apparently a
video tape of Judge Michael Mulchings
explaining the difference among pleas of no
contest, guilty, and not guilty; the rights

withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing in pan that his
constitutional nght to counsel was violated at the
arraignment.

Defendant

maintained

that

he

"unk[n]owingly plead[ed] guilty to erroneous charges
and additional charges that were m error." The tnal
court denied defendant's motion as untimely.
Defendant filed a timely Notice of Appeal, and was
appointed counsel to assist him with his appeal.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] 1 6 Defendant argues that his guilty pleas must be
set aside because they were accepted by the tnal court
in violation of his Sixth Amendment nght to counsel,
his due process nghts under .Article I, Section 7 ofthe
Utah Constitution, and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure. " *[T]he ultimate quesnon of
whether the trial court stnctiy complied with
constitutional and procedural requirements for entry
of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed
for correctness.' " State v. Benvenuto. 983 P.2d 556,

558 (Utah 1999) (quoting State v. Holland, 921 P.2d
430, 433 (Utah 1996)).
[2] 1 7 Defendant also argues that this coun should
overrule that portion of State v. Pnce. 837 P.2d 578
(Utah Ct.App.1992), holding that, when a defendant
was so advised, the thirty-day rule set out in Utah
Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1999) is junsdicnonal
and runs from the date of the plea heanng, not from
the date of sentencing. See Pnce, 837 P 2d at 583.
The Utah Supreme Court's holding in State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), is dispositive
of this contention.

Under Thurman, this court is

bound by the doctrine of stare decisis and cannot
overrule another panel's ruling.
See id. at 1269.
Accordingly, because "[w]e are not at liberty to

Copr. S West 2000 No Claim to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works

996 P 2d 1065

(Cite as: ^96 P.2d 1065, M067)

overrule our prior holding," Kunz & Co. v. State

Dep't of Transp, 949 P.2d :'63, 767 (Utah
Ct.App.1997), we do not address this issue further.

presumption of innocence, the right against
compulsory self-incrimination, the nght to a

speedy public tnal before an impartial jury, the
nght to confront and cross-examine in open court

the prosecution witnesses, the nght to compel the

* 1068 ANALYSIS

attendance of defense witnesses, and that by

[3][4][5] «] 8 The tnal court properly warned
defendant that if he wanted to withdraw his guilty

pleas, he must file a motion to do so within thirty
days of the plea proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. §
77-13- 6(2)(b) (1999); see also Utah R.Crim. P.

11(e)(7) (providing tnal court "may not accept [a
guilty] plea until the court has found ... the defendant
has been advised of the time limits for filing any
motion to withdraw the plea"). Notwithstanding the

tnal court's clear instructions, defendant failed to file
his motion until well after the time limit had expired.
Because defendant's motion was untimely, the tnal
court was without junsdiction to reach the ments.
See Price 837 P 2d at583. In accordance with State
v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998), however,
this court can review defendant's guilty pleas for plain

error or exceptional circumstances. [FN2] See also
Pnce, 837 P.2d at 580. To succeed on a claim of

entering the plea, these nghts are waived;
(4) {A] the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which the plea is

entered, that upon tnal the prosecution would
have the burden of provmg each of those
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the
plea is an admission ofall those elements;

(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. Afactual
basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged
enme was actually committed by the defendant

or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable
to admit culpability, that the prosecution has
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk
of conviction;

(5) the defendant knows the rrnnimum and
maximum sentence, and if applicable, the
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum
sentence, thatmay be imposed for each offense to

plain error, a defendant has the burden of showing

which a plea is entered, including the possibility

"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been

(6) if the tendered plea is a result ofa prior plea
discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what

obvious to the tnal court;

and (iii) the error is

harmful.'' State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah
1993); accord Marvin, 964 P.2d at 318.
FN2. We recognize the apparent anomaly of
our reaching an issue not preserved below
because the trial coun: lacked junsdiction to
first address the same.
Conceptually,

however, error is error whether committed
in the context of plea proceedings or tnal.
Ifthe error is plain, the trial court isobliged

to recognize and correct the same at the
time of occurrence, and may or may not be
in a position to later correct the error
depending onthe procedural context.

[6] 1 9 Defendant argues mat the trial court
committed plain error by failing to protect both his
constitutional and procedural nghts under Rule 11 of
the Utah Rules of Crirninal Procedure.

Rule 11(e)

mandates, in pertinent part:

The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty,
no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not

accept the plea until the court lias found:

(1) ifthe defendant is not represented by counsel,
he or she has knowingly waived the nght to
counsel and does not desire counsel;

(2) the plea is voluntanly ma.de;

(3) the defendant knows of the nght to the

ofthe imposition of consecutive sentences;

agreement has been reached;

(7) the defendant has been advised of the time
limits, for filing any motion to withdraw the plea;
and

(8) the defendant has been advised that the right
of appeal is limited.
Utah R-Cnm. P. 11(e) (emphasis added).

[7][8][9"| 1 10 " 'Rule 11(e) squarely places on tnal
courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and
Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a

guilty plea is entered.' " Benvenuto, 983 P.2d at 558
(quoting State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312
(Utah 1987)).

The trial court must stnctiy *1069

adhere to Rule 11(e).

See State v. Thurman. 911

P.2d 37!, 372 (Utah 1996).

Under the ... strict compliance test, before

accepting the guilty plea, the tnal court must
review on the record with the defendant at the

time the plea is taken the nature and elements of
the offense, the constitunonal nghts articulated in
Rule 11 which he waives by pleading guilty, and
the allowable penalties.

State v. Phams, 798 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah

Ct App 1990); see also State v. Penman, 964 P2d

1157, 1160 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ("The tnal judge
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bears the burden ot establishing, on the record, strict

and elements of the charged crimes.

compliance with Rule 11(e).").

Valencia, 776 P 2d 1332, 1335 <Utah Ct.App.1989}

[10][111 " 11 After reviewing the record, we find
that the tnal court discussed only one of the seven

(per cunam). "Mere general questions which ask
whether a plea is 'voluntary' are insufficient under
Rule 11[ (e)(2) ]. Specific inquiry should be made as

applicable Rule 11(e) requirements in coun and on
the record with defendant.

Fust, the tnal court failed

to determine whether defendant was represented by
counsel, or whether he voluntanly waived his nght to
counsel.
See Utah R.Cnm. P. 11(e)(1).
Rule U
embodies the Sixth Amendment [FN3] right to
counsel and requires the tnal court to establish that a
defendant has knowingly waived his or her nght to
Utah R.Cnm. P. 1Ha).
counsel "in open court."
Hence, "[tjhe court ... may not accept the [guilty] plea
until the court has found[,j ... if the defendant is not
represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly
waived the nght to counsel and does not desire
counsel." Utah R.Cnm. P. 11(e) (emphasis added).
Here, the tnal coun clearly erred by accepting
defendant's guilty plea without first determining that
defendant waived his nght to counsel. No discussion
took place regarding this nght or defendant's wish to

See State v

to whether defendant understands that by his plea he
waives his nghts against self-incnrmnation. to a jury
tnal, to appeal, and to confront witnesses." Id.
Because "[a] guilty plea cannot be voluntary if tt is
uninformed," defendant's guilty plea was involuntary.
State v, Breckenndge. 688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah
1983).
"1 13 Third, the tnal court failed to inform defendant

of his constitutional nghts and that, by pleading
guilty, he was waiving these nghts.
See Utah
R.Cnm. P. 11(e)(3);

see also State v. Visser. 973

P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah Ct.App.) (holding because tnal
coun failed to advise defendant of nght to speedy
tnal pursuant to Rule 11(e)(3), it abused its discretion
m denying motion to withdraw guilty plea), cert,
granted, 982 P.2d 87 (Utah 1999); State v. Mills. 898

P.2d 819, 824 (Utah Ct.App.1995); infra note 5.

waive it.

[13][14] f 14 Fourth, the tnal coun failed to explain
FN3. "The Sixth Amendment of the United

to defendant the nature and elements of the offense

States Constitution guarantees each cnminal
defendant the nght to assistance of

and to find a factual basis for the plea. See Utah
R.Cnm. P. ll(eX4)(A) & (B).
If a defendant does

counsel.'' State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799,
808 (Utah 1999); accord State v. Heaton,

958 P 2d 911, 917 (Utah 1998). "The nght
to

have

the assistance of counsel

in

a

cnminal tnal is a fundamental constitutional

right which must be jealously protected by
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917.
Additionally, "(t]he Sixth Amendment nght

the tnal court."
to

counsel

attaches

at

the

initiation

of

adversary judicial criminal proceedings,
whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary
heanng,
indictment,
information, or arraignment.' " State v.
Wood,

868

P2d

70,

86

(Utah

1993)

(quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882, 32 L.Ed.2d 411
(1972); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,
629, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1407, 89 L.Ed.2d 631
(1986)).
Thus, defendant's Sixth
Amendment nght to counsel had attached at
the arraignment when he entered his guilty
pleas.

[12] *j 12 Second, the tnal court did not determine
whether defendant's guilty plea was voluntanly made.
See Utah R.Cnm. P. 11(e)(2). The tnal court never
asked defendant whether he was acting voluntarily,
informed him about the constitutional rights he was
waiving by pleading guilty, or explamed the nature

"not understand the nature and elements of the cnme

to which he pled guilty," his guilty plea is
involuntarily made.
Breckenndge, 688 P.2d at
443-44. " '[B]ecause a guilty plea is an admission of
all the elements of a formal "1070 cnminal charge, it
cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant
possesses an understanding of the law in relation to
the facts.' " Id. at 444 (alteration in ongmal) (quoting
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89
S.Ct 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) (footnote
omitted)). Additionally, a defendant's "understanding
of the elements of the charges and the relationship of
the law and the facts may not be presumed from a

silent or incomplete examination." Valencia. 776
P.2d at 1335. Accordingly, a tnal coun's "[fjailure
to inform a defendant of the nature and elements of

the offense is fatal to a guilty plea conviction."
Pharris, 798 P.2d at 777.

[15] H 15 Fifth, the tnal coun did not tell defendant
about the possible punishments. See Utah R.Cnm. P.
11(e)(5). "In order for defendant's guilty plea to be
valid and in compliance with rule 11(e)(5) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure .... the record must

show that he was uneqmvocabiy and clearly informed
about the sentence that would be imposed." State v.
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Smith, 777 P 2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989); see Pharns,
798 P.2d at 777-78.

If the tnal court fails to do so,

the guilty plea is not knowingly and voluntarily made
and must be vacated.

See Smith, 777 P.2d at 466.

allowable punishment for the crimes charged and
should note that multiple punishments for
multiple crimes may be imposed consecutively.
The affidavit should list ndividually and

*! 16 Sixth and last, the tnal court failed to advise

specifically the nghts waived by the entry of the
guilty plea.
The details of any plea bargain

defendant that his nght to appeal was limited.

See

should be set forth in the affidavit, as well as a

The tnal court therefore

FN4. We note that the tnal judge informed
defendant that he had thirty days within

disclaimer
concerning
any
sentencmg
recommendations as required by Rule 11(e).
Finally, the affidavit should disclose the
defendant's ability to read and understand the
English language, the absence of promises to
induce the plea, and the defendant's competency.

which to file a motion to

The tnal judge should then review the statements

Utah R.Cnm P. 11(e)(8).

failed to comply with six of the seven relevant
requirements mandated by Rule 11 (<:). [FN4]

withdraw his

guilry pleas. See Utah R.Cnm. P. 11(e)(7).
Subsection

(6)

of

Rule

11(e)

is

not

applicable to the facts before us. See Utah
R.Cnm. P. 11(e)(6) (addressing plea
agreements).

[16][17] U 17 It is apparent from the record that the
coun relied upon the Hutchings video to satisfy the
Rule 11(e) requirements. When determining whether
a guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, a court may
consider more than just the "record of the plea
heanng," and "may look at the surrounding facts and
circumstances."

Salazar v. Warden, Utah State

Pnson, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993).
"[The] record may reflect [Rule II compliance]
by multiple means, e.g., transcript of the oral
colloquy between the court and defendant,
contents of a written affidavit that the record

reflects was read, understood, and acknowledged
by defendant and the court, contents of other
documents such as the infonnation, presentence
reports, exhibits, etc., similarly incorporated into
the record, and so on."

Penman, 964 P.2d at 1160 (quoting State v.
Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218
(Utah 1991))
(alterations in original).
1] 18 Indeed, the supreme court in State v. Gibbons
sanctioned the trial court's use of a written affidavit

signed by the defendant as an efficient means to

in the affidavit with the defendant, question the
defendant concerning his understanding of it, and
fulfill the other requirements imposed by [Rule
11(e) ] on the record before accepting the guilty
plea.
If a court does not use an affidavit, the
requirements set forth above *1071 and in [Rule
11(e) ] must still be followed and be on the
record.

Id. at 1313-14 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
U 19 The court in Gibbons recognized that, although
"[t]his procedure may take additional time," a
defendants "constitutional rights may not be
sacrificed in the name of judicial economy." Ed. at
1314.

11 20 The video tape generally discusses those
constitutional and other requirements set out in Rule
11(e). However, after reviewing the transenpt, it is
clear that by simply having a defendant view the tape
without making any effort to determine the
circumstances under which a particular defendant
viewed trie tape or his or her level of understanding
thereof, not only fails to satisfy the tnal court's
responsibility of ensuring on the record that a
defendant's guilty plea is knowing and voluntary in
accordance with the requirements of Rule 11(e), but
renders the tape virtually useless even as a
preliminary foundation for Rule 11(e) compliance.

comply with the strict requirements of Rule 11(e).
See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313.

The court outlined

what an acceptable affidavit must contain:
A sufficient affidavit is one which is signed by
the defendant, his attorney, the prosecutor, and
the trial judge and which lists, the names and the
degrees of the crimes charged.
The affidavit
should contain both a statement of the elements

of the offenses and a synopsis of the defendant's
acts that establish the elements of the crimes

charged.

The affidavit should clearly state the

H 21 The tape first discusses the difference between a
plea of no contest, not guilty, and guilty.
It then
discusses in sufficient detail the consequences of
pleading guilty or no contest and the constitutional
[FN5] rights a defendant will waive by entering such
a plea. The tape correctly informs a defendant that
"[i]f you plead guilty or no contest and later wish to
withdraw your plea, you must file a motion to
withdraw your plea in court within thirty days." See
Utah
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6<2)(bl (1995);
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R.Cnm. P. llieii"').
It then briefly discusses, in
genenc terms, "the different classifications of cnmes
and the potential punishments associated with each
[classification],"

substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional
right." Wagstaff v. Barnes. S02 P 2d ""4. "6 iUtah
Ct.App. 1990) (emphasis added). A trial court's error
that depnves a defendant of his or her constitutional
nght to counsel "will always invalidate the

F\5 Had the tnal court ascertained, on the

conviction." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U S. 275,
2"8, 113 S.Ct. 2078. 2081. 124 L.Ed.2d 132 (1993).

record,

the circumstances of defendant's

sewing of this portion ofthe tape and his
understanding thereof, this portion may
have
satisfied
the
corresponding
requirements of Rule 11(e).

*] 22 While the tape may play an important role in
generally appnsmg a defendant of his or her nghts
and preparing the defendant for the arraignment
heanng before the tnal court, it does not provide
"real notice of the true nature of the charge against
him, the first and most universally recognized

requirement of due process." ' " Gibbons, 740 P.2d at
1312 iquoting Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637.
645, 96 S.Ct. 2253. 2257, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976)

(quoting Smith v, O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334, 61
S.Ct. 572, 574, 85 L.Ed. 859 (1941))). Although the
video touches upon several of the requirements set
out m Rule 11(e), it is not specific to the accused, but

is general in nature.

Most importantly, and unlike

the affidavit sanctioned in Gibbons, the tape does not
fulfill the well-established mandate that the tnal court
discuss with the defendant on the record the Rule

11(e) requirements, ensure that defendant understands
these elements, and ascertain that defendant's guilty

plea was voluntanly made.

c 23 Other than advising defendant on the record of
the necessity of filing a motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas within thirty days, the trial court erred by failing
to stnctiy comply with Rule 11(e) in most respects.
Considering the number of cases addressing Rule
1lie), see e.g.. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d at 558; Smith,
777 P 2d at 464-66; Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-14;

Breckenndge, 688 P.2d at 443-44; Visser, 973 P.2d
at 1001-02; Penman, 964 P.2d at 1160-61; Mills, 898
P.2d at 823-24;
Pharris, 798 P.2d at 774-78;
Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1334-35, it should have been
obvious to the trial court that those requirements were
never discussed with defendant on the record and its

failure to do so constituted plain error.

*1072 " '[T]he assistance of counsel is among those
"constitutional nghts so basic to a fair tnal that their
infraction can never be treated as harmless error.

Wagstaff, 802 P.2d at 7~6 (alteration m original)
(quoting Holloway v. .Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489,
98 S.Ct. 1173, 1181, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (19"8) (quoting
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. IS, 43. 8" S.Ct.
824, 837, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967))).

1 25 Additionally, as set out above, a tnal cowl's
"[f]ailure to inform a defendant of the nature and
elements of the offense is fatal to a guilty plea
conviction." Phams, 798 P.2d at 777.
Because
defendant was not told of the nature and elements of

the offense, the possible punishments, or the
constitutional nghts, including his nght to counsel,
that he was waiving by pleading guilty, he was not
fully informed ofthe consequences of his plea and his
plea thus cannot be considered voluntary. See Smith,
777 P.2d at 466; Breckenndge, 688 P.2d at 444;
Visser, 973 P.2d at 1002; Phams, 798 P.2d at 777.

[20] 1j 26 The record also reflects that defendant did
not believe he was guilty of joynding, but thought it
best to plead guilty so that he could "get on with [his]
life." " 'The court has an undoubted duty to guard
against the possibility that an accused who is innocent
of the crime charged may be induced to plead guilty
without sufficient understanding of the nature of the
charge or the consequences of the plea.
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 443 (quoting State v.
Hams, 585 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1978)) (omission in

onginal).

If the defendant here had understood the

nature and elements of joynding, he might not have

pleaded guilty to that charge. Because "[a] guilty
plea cannot be voluntary if it is uninformed," id.,
defendant's guilty plea was involuntary, and therefore
the tnal court's error was prejudicial to defendant.

See Marvin,

964P,2dat318; Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208.

[18][19] «1 24 We cannot say that the tnal court's
enors were not prejudicial to defendant.
See

CONCLUSION

1[ 27 We hold that the tnal court erred by failing to
stnctiy comply with Rule 11(e). That error should

Marvin, 964 P.2d at 318; Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208.

have been obvious to

Where, as here, no valid waiver appears of record,
see supra note 3. "the denial of [the] nght to the
assistance of counsel at trial is presumptively a

prejudicial to defendant. Defendant's convictions are
therefore vacated, his guilty pleas are withdrawn, and

the

tnal

coun and was

we remand the case to the tnal court for further
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proceedmgs on the information.
1 28 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD,

Presiding Judge, GREGORY K, ORME, Judge.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Addendum B
Order Granting Petition
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•istcpher 3lain Ostler,
Defendant

and
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Resocndent.

:RDER

This rr.atter is before the court upon a Petition for a
"tiorari, filed pursuant to Rule 48, of the Utah Rules o
;ellate

IT

13

Procedure.

HEREBY ORDERED that

the

Petition

for Writ

of

Certiorari filed on April 12, 2000, by petitioner is granted
Review will be limited to deciding whether the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction to decide the merits of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea, once it concluded that the trial ecu:
lacked

Jurisdiction

to

consider the merits.

FOR

THE

COURT:

/£, 2W<?
Richard C.
Chief

Howe

Justice

M rt — ^-- - -J •J

£, K x - r _'

"y that on July ^3-, 2000, a trt

nerecv

an;

:rrect

ry

of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered to a personal

representative of the Legal Defender's Office to be delivered to
the party listed below:
JOAN

C.

SALT

LAKE

WATT
LEGAL

DEFENDER ASSOCIATION

424 E 500 5 STE 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 34111

and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was handdelivered to a personal representative of the Attorney General's
Office to be delivered to the party listed below:
CHRISTINE

SOLTIS

ASSISTANT

ATTORNEY

160

3

PO

E

300

BOX

6TH

GENERAL

FL

140354

SALT LAKE CITY UT

84114-0854

and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited
in the United States

mail

to

the trial

court

listed below:

THIRD DISTRICT, WEST VALLEY
ATTN: JANET (EXT. 2407)
3636

CONSTITUTION

WEST

VALLEY

CITY

BLVD

UT

84119

and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand
delivered to a personal representative of the court(s) listed
below:

JULIA

D'ALESANDRO

COURT

OF

450

STATE

PO

S

BOX

SALT

APPEALS

ST

140230

LAKE

CITY

UT

84114-0230

Deputy Clerk
Case

No.

20000287-SC

THIRD DISTRICT,

WEST VALLEY , 985101649

Addendum C
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(1999)
Utah R. Crim. P. 11

Utah R. App. P. 4

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
i1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
12) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause
shown and with leave of the court.

(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
'3) This section does not restrict the righto of an imprisoned person under
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 11. Pleas.

•at Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a

represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. 1he
reasonable time to confer with counsel.

ib) Adefendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason

of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. Adefendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If adefendant refuses to plead or
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not

^cfAdefendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court

id) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
<et for trial. Adefendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
earlv trial In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for ajury trial.
!e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentellv ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found.
11) if"the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowing!}
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;

.

(3) the defendant knows of the nght to the presumption of innocence the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the nght to a speedy public tnal
before in impartial jury, the nght to confront and cross-examine in open.court

the prosecution witnesses, the nght to compel the attendance of defense

witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived,
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements ofthe offense to

which the plea is entered, that upon tnal the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond areasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission ofall those elements;

....

ffl • t :f :t

(B> there is a factual basis for the plea. Afactual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant
or if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish asubstantial nsk of conviction

.5i the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and it

applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence that
mav be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
Dossibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;

_

' -6) if the tendered plea is a result of a pnor plea discussion and plea
agreement, and ifso, what agreement has been reached;

7-. the defendant has been advised ofthe time limits for filing any motion to

withdraw the plea; and

.
i;m;,-^
<8) the defendant has been advised that the nght
of appeal s^d
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
o, if used ^affidavit recking these factors after the court has established

that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
affidavit. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be
sufficient that the affidavit has been read or translated to the defendant
Unless specificallv required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea
?fl Failure to advise the defendant ofthe time limits for filing any motion to
Withdraw aplea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not aground
for seumg the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
igtil. If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other partv na*

asrreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by

thf2)0ifsentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall
advTse the drfendL personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not

^hlu) ^ud^shall not participate in plea discussions poor to any plea
aDTPpment heine made by the prosecuting attorney.

*tf? Wten a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon

request of toe parties, may permit the disclosure ofthe tentative agreement

and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender ofthe plea The judge

may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the

^£&^££?*SLl disposition should not be in confo,

mity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then

call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution a
defendant meV enter aconditional plea of guilty, gui ty and^mentally ill or no
contest reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to Aa
a

re^ew of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea^
(j) When adefendant tenders aplea of guilty and mentally ,11, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill maccordance
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103
.Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1. 1996; November 1, 1997.)

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
a Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is
permitted as a matter of nght from the triaT court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk ofthe trial court
within 30 days after the date of entrv- of the judgment or order appealed from.
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or

unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed
with the clerk of the tnal court within 10 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from.

!bi Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (l! for judgment under
Rule 50(bi; (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact,
whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion

is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4> under Rule
59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry"
ofthe order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion.
Similarly, if a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is

filed in the trial court under Rule 24 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all

parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new tnal. A notice of
appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no
effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time

measured from the entry ofthe order ofthe trial court disposing ofthe motion
as provided above.

•ci Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in

paragraph lb) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a

decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the tnal court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
id) Additional orcross-appeal. If a timely notice ofappealis filed by a party,

any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on

which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise

prescnbed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
:e) Extension oftime to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing ofexcusable

neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon

motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration ofthe time prescnbed

by paragraph (a) of this rule. Amotion filed before expiration of the prescnbed
time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a
motion filed after expiration ofthe prescribed time shall be given to the other

parties in accordance with the rules of practice ofthe trial court. No extension

shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date ofentry

of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.

if) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an inmate confined in

an institution files a notice ofappeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the

notice of appeal is timelv filed ifit isdeposited intheinstitution s internal mail

svstem on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a
notarized statement or wntten declaration setting forth the date ofdeposit and

stating thatfirst-class postage has been prepaid. Ifa notice of appeal is filed in

the manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day penod provided in
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice
of appeal.

Amended effective November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999.)

